Two wars rage in South Asia. One is in Afghanistan, where after eight years, some 100,000 American and NATO troops still fight in the deserts and mountain passes of a state in its death throes. The other is in Pakistan, where the Pakistani military now struggles against indigenous tribal forces, tactically allied to al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban. Together, they pose a mortal threat to the state itself, and thus to allied forces in Afghanistan.

There are no easy solutions to either war, which is why President Barack Obama is slowly making his way toward a decision that will decide the fate of the war in Afghanistan, and to a large extent the fate of the war in Pakistan. If the U.S. walks away from the fight with the Taliban, why should Pakistan do otherwise?

It is both foolish and wrong to say we have accomplished little or nothing in Afghanistan. With the defeat of the Taliban government in Kabul, millions of Afghan refugees have returned home, and millions of Afghan children are back in school, including Afghan girls, many for the first time. This is no small achievement. What the Afghan people lack, however, particularly in the Pushtun areas, is security. Until security is made permanent and real, the Afghans will withhold judgment. From my own experience in Vietnam and South Asia, people will support that government which can best demonstrate its ability to govern. The first element is always security.

This is a view that favors counterinsurgency, with its emphasis on protecting civilians. It is a strategy strongly backed by the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. But it comes with a high political and military price tag because it calls for thousands of additional troops, anywhere from 10,000 to 65,000. The problem is that thousands more troops means many more U.S. casualties.

The alternative is counterterrorism, which means far fewer troops and perhaps a reduction in the number of troops already in Afghanistan to about 20,000. The emphasis would shift from that of protecting the civilian population to going after Taliban and al-Qaida fighters themselves, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would be done principally with special forces and drone aircraft, both engaging in cross-border operations. Until recently, this approach was favored by Vice President Joe Biden. He now seems to favor a hybrid approach involving elements from a counterinsurgency strategy as well as that of counterterrorism.

The counterinsurgency approach is said to be winning if only because a counterterrorist strategy would be seen as the beginning of a withdrawal and thus eventual concession of the war to the Taliban and al-Qaida. In my view, withdrawal at this point would be a mistake. It would severely undermine the fragile possibility of a more stable Afghanistan, further destabilizing the border with Pakistan.

This, in turn, would greatly encourage the radical forces now fighting the Pakistani army, undermining a nuclear-armed country of some 170 million people with dangerous consequences for the entire world. That must not happen. Moreover, an obvious defeat in Afghanistan would encourage the enemies of Western-style freedom around the world.

Finally, it may be old-fashioned, but frankly we have a moral obligation to the Afghan people. Amid great destruction, we gave them hope by getting rid of the Taliban. After so much suffering, we really cannot let that hope die. Not only would the Afghans never forgive us as we marched away, but we would surrender much of our claim to moral leadership. The Obama presidency would never recover.

Fortunately, that option does not seem to be in the cards. As the U.S. struggles with strategy, however, it also faces an invidious situation that will hamper us no matter what we decide to do.

We cannot stabilize the current struggle without a genuine Afghan partner. We have not had one in President Hamid Karzai. His government is notoriously corrupt even by historical Afghan standards, and all Afghans know it. He does not have the country's confidence, and that is key to any successful strategy.

There is no doubt that he stole last summer's presidential election, and only under great pressure has he agreed to a runoff. Now we discover that his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, perhaps more powerful than the president himself, is not only deeply involved in the drug trade but is reported to be on the CIA payroll. It's a situation even Hollywood would find far-fetched. But there it is.

It seems to me that Hamid Karzai must go. The preferred way is by means of a runoff election with former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. But go, he must. That should be a key element in any new strategy. No wonder Obama is taking his time.

William M. Stewart, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and Time magazine correspondent, lives in Santa Fe.